

91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971); see also Fort Belknap Indian Community v. Mazurek, 43 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1994) (abstention appropriate if ongoing state judicial proceedings implicate important state interests and offer adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues). "[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts." Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972); see also Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1980).

Younger abstention is appropriate in favor of a state proceeding if three criteria are met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff's federal constitutional claims. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1992). An exception to *Younger* exists if petitioner makes a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate." San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce PAC v. San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Middlesex*, 457 U.S. at 435). Here, it appears to the Court that all three criteria for Younger abstention are met with respect to the criminal proceeding still pending against petitioner in California. Moreover, petitioner has failed to show the type of special circumstances that warrant federal intervention. Nor has he shown any bad faith or harassment by state officials, or that he will be irreparably injured by waiting until the conclusion of the California criminal proceeding to assert his claims.

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The holding in *Carden* confirms that abstention is appropriate here. In that case, the petitioners had moved in state court for a dismissal of the claims against them, alleging a violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial court granted the motion but the Montana Supreme Court reversed. The petitioners then filed their petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. The district court granted the petition finding a violation of petitioners' constitutional right to a speedy trial. In reversing the grant of the writ, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the merits of the speedy trial claim did not determine the appropriateness of federal intervention. The court noted that "unlike the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Speedy Trial Clause, when raised as an affirmative defense, does not embody a right which is necessarily forfeited by delaying review until after trial. . . . Rather[,] . . . a speedy trial claim is best reviewed after trial when the district court's dismissal is more conclusive and allegations of prejudice are less speculative." 626 F.2d at 84.

Like the speedy trial claim in *Carden*, petitioner's claims here do not embody rights which are "necessarily forfeited by delaying review until after trial." *Id.* As the Supreme Court stated in *Younger*, a criminal prosecution, "even though alleged to be unauthorized and hence unlawful is not alone ground for relief" 401 U.S. at 46.

Here, as in *Carden*, all of petitioner's claims will be subject to review after trial. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances necessary to justify interference in the ongoing state proceedings.

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Case 5:08-cv-01960-SGL-FFM Document 4 Filed 01/27/09 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:25